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Linking Environmental and Innovation Policy 
 
Summary 
This paper addresses the timing and interdependence between innovation and 
environmental policy in a model of research and development (R&D). On a first-best 
path the environmental tax is set at the Pigouvian level, independent of innovation 
policy. With infinite patent lifetime, the R&D subsidy should be constant and 
independent of the state of the environment. However, with finite patent lifetime, 
optimal innovation policy depends on the stage of the environmental problem. In the 
early stages of an environmental problem, abatement research should be subsidized at a 
high level and this subsidy should fall monotonically over time to stimulate initial R&D 
investments. Alternatively, with a constant R&D subsidy, patents’ length should 
initially have a very long life-time but this should be gradually shortened. In a second-
best situation with no deployment subsidy for abatement equipment, we find that the 
environmental tax should be high compared to the Pigouvian levels when an abatement 
industry is developing, but the relative difference falls over time. That is, environmental 
policies will be accelerated compared to first-best. 
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In the coming decades radical policy interventions are necessary to halt the continuing 
increase in atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations (IPCC, 2007; Stern Review, 
2007). Technology improvements are an important element for achieving deep 
emission cuts (see, e.g., surveys in Jaffe et al. (2002), Löschel (2002), Carraro et al. 
(2003), and Jaffe et al. (2005)). They are essential for the success of the proposals 
brought forward on 23 January 2008 by the European Commission.
2 The proposals 
aim at reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 20% in 2020, compared to 1990, setting 
carbon prices through the EU Emission Trading System and, in addition to that, 
setting binding targets for renewable energy sources and Carbon Capture and Storage 
(CCS). The question we address in this paper is whether, in general, setting the 
environmental prices right is sufficient to trigger the required technological 
developments or whether there is the need for extra policies directed specifically at 
the enhancement of abatement technologies. We will study this question in a partial 
model with a pollutant stock, inelastic benchmark emissions, abatement technology, 
and innovation through R&D. 
  When we assume complete and competitive markets, optimal environmental 
policy only needs to set the price of the pollutant at the net present value of the future 
stream of marginal damages. We refer to this shadow price of emissions as the 
Pigouvian tax.
3 Even if technology adjusts to the environmental policy, we still can 
maintain the Pigouvian tax as the efficient choice as long as the markets for 
innovations function well, e.g. through patents. It is believed, though, that the market 
for innovations is imperfect. Nordhaus (2002), for example, in his numerical analysis 
of R&D and climate policy, assumes that the social value of innovations exceeds the 
private value of innovations by factor 4. Under these circumstances, there may be the 
need for policy to correct the innovation market, and the question becomes apparent 
whether a specific innovation policy is required for environmental technology. If the 
gap between social and private returns on innovation is identical over different 
economic sectors, then a generic innovation policy can correct the innovation market 
failure. But if the gap between social and private returns of innovation changes over 
the life-cycle of an environmental problem, then there might be the need for 
innovation policy that is specifically directed to environmental technology, changing 
with the stage of the environmental problem. 
  The basis of our analysis we borrow from the early literature on endogenous 
growth and environmental policy. Much of the early work in this field studied 
balanced growth paths (c.f. Bovenberg and Smulders, 1995), or transition dynamics 
where the environment moves from a dirty to a clean steady state (cf. Bovenberg and 
Smulders, 1996). In some ways, this strand of literature is a dynamic extension of the 
double dividend literature, which looked at the effects of environmental policy on the 
overall tax distortion in a static economy. One specific question addressed in the 
double dividend literature was whether the efficient environmental tax should exceed 
or fall short of the Pigouvian tax.
4 In this paper, we do the same comparison, but in a 
                                                 
2 See http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/climate_action.htm (accessed 17 April 2008) for details. 
3 This is a choice for convenience, common in environmental economics. Alternatively, the Pigouvian 
tax could be considered that level that internalizes all externalities, also non-environmental. 
4 Much of this literature focused on tax interaction effects (c.f. Bovenberg and de Mooij, 1994) 
suggesting efficient environmental taxes to be lower than the Pigouvian level. Other reasons for a 
divergence between efficient environmental and Pigouvian taxes include trade effects (Hoel, 1996), 
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dynamic context with innovation. Hart (2008) shows that an environmental tax can be 
set equal to the Pigouvian tax as long as the economy is on a balanced growth path. 
He also shows conditions for higher (or lower) emission taxes, compared to Pigouvian 
levels, outside the balanced growth paths but these conditions are not easy to 
interpret.
5 
  There are two major differences in our paper with this strand of literature. 
First, we do not consider a closed economy but for convenience apply a partial 
analysis, as we think that most of the general equilibrium feedbacks do not affect the 
results substantially. Second, the transition we consider is of a different nature from 
most of the literature above. In the context of climate change and most other 
environmental problems, the life-cycle of the environmental problem is not 
characterized by a transition from an initially dirty state of the environment to a clean 
state. On the contrary, at first stage, the pollutant stock is almost harmless due to its 
small size. The economy moves from low emission levels and a clean environment to 
high emissions and a large pollutant stock, and to prevent an ecological collapse, at 
some point in time, the economy must move back to a state with low emissions and a 
clean environment.
6 That is, emissions follow a hump-shaped curve and the pollutant 
stock also follows a – delayed – hump-shaped curve. At the initial stage, the 
Pigouvian tax will rise sharply, but after the first stage, the growth rate of the 
Pigouvian tax will gradually fall (Hoel and Kverndokk, 1996). The use of abatement 
technologies will follow a similar hump-shaped pattern, though it will not return to 
zero. The life-cycle pattern may have important implications for abatement 
technology policy. Kverndokk and Rosendahl (2007) find that this pattern generates a 
high optimal subsidy rate for abatement when the abatement technology is first 
adopted, while the subsidy falls significantly over time as the abatement technology 
matures. They derive these conclusions from a numerical model with learning by 
doing. The question, addressed in the current paper, is whether the policy 
recommendations in terms of the timing of an extra technology stimulus carries over 
to an R&D model, and whether we can support the analysis analytically, rather than 
numerically. 
  Our analysis is also connected to the literature on the timing of abatement. 
Various applied studies on climate change policy have concluded that there is a need 
for up-front investment in abatement technologies to stimulate innovation (Ha-Duong 
et al., 1997; Grübler and Messner, 1998; van der Zwaan et al., 2002; Kverndokk and 
Rosendahl, 2007). Others have argued that this finding is an artefact of the typical 
models in use where innovation occurs through Learning by Doing (LbD) 
mechanisms. It has been suggested that models that describe innovation through R&D 
would not support early abatement (Goulder and Mathai, 2000; Nordhaus, 2002). We 
extend this timing literature, shifting the question from the timing of abatement levels 
                                                                                                                                            
scale effects in production (Liski, 2002), and, more recently, the processes underlying technological 
change. Rosendahl (2004) shows that in an LbD model with spillovers, the environmental tax should be 
higher than a Pigouvian tax. In a similar fashion, Golombek and Hoel (2005, Proposition 9) show that 
in an environmental treaty the optimal emission price can exceed the Pigouvian level when abatement 
targets lead to innovation and international technology spillovers. 
5 Though the conditions are analytically hard, numerically, Hart (2002) shows through simulations for 
the climate change problem that the efficient carbon tax may exceed the Pigouvian level substantially, 
at least for the coming century. 
6 This environmental pollution cycle has also been studied in Smulders and Bretschger (2000). Hart 
(2008) also considers a situation where the abatement sector is small initially but rapidly increases in 
size. 
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to the timing of abatement policies, including the timing of environmental taxes and 
R&D subsidies. 
  The third strand of literature we refer is the literature on optimal lifetime of 
patents. Patent policy has obvious welfare implications. In general, an increase in the 
patent length is growth enhancing by raising the rate of return of R&D. On the other 
hand, patents create a static inefficiency as patents allow monopolistic supply by the 
patent holder. Longer patents thereby reduce output and thus consumption, by 
increasing the portion of the monopolistic sector. Thus, patents have two opposite 
welfare effects, one favouring long patents, the other favouring short patents. Judd 
(1985) finds the optimal patent lifetime to be infinite, but in his exogenous growth 
model, all goods are equally priced so there is no distortion due to monopoly. Chou 
and Shy (1993), in a discrete time model, contrast a one period lifetime with an 
infinite lifetime and find that a one period lifetime is preferred. Iwaisako and 
Futagami (2003) find an optimal finite patent lifetime to trade-off the two opposite 
effects. These studies focus on balanced growth paths. We extend this literature 
considering optimal patent length along a transition path. 
  Models with finite patent lifetime are rare in the environmental economics 
literature. Though many environmental economics R&D models incorporate the idea 
that innovators cannot appropriate the full value of their innovations (Parry, 1995; 
Nordhaus, 2002; Popp, 2004; and Gerlagh and Lise, 2005), this feature is more often 
captured through a simple constant appropriation parameter, and almost never through 
finite patent lifetime as in Nordhaus (1969). Consequently, these environment-
economy models define a constant appropriation parameter that measures the gap 
between social and private returns of R&D, and a constant innovation subsidy suffices 
to correct for this market failure. In comparison, we study finite patents in an 
environment-economy model so that the appropriation share becomes a non-constant 
variable. 
    This paper is organised in the following way. In Section 2 we develop a partial 
model for a pollution stock, abatement, and R&D, and analyse conditions for the 
social optimum. Patents, giving a monopoly right to produce a patented good, are the 
only reason for private firms’ R&D activity. The model has a similar structure as 
Futagami and Iwaisako (2007) but with continuous time. Technological change is 
driven by the Romer (1987, 1990) type of endogenous growth, based on horizontal 
innovation or the ‘love of variety’ concept (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977). In our model, 
there are three imperfections related to innovations: too little production of patented 
abatement equipment due to monopolistic competition, positive spillovers of 
innovations after the expiration of the patent, and negative spillovers of total research 
effort on new innovations due to crowding out. The R&D model is linked to a 
pollution stock model so that we can study the optimal joint environmental and 
innovation policy. We assume an inelastic benchmark emission path, abatement as 
emission reduction, and the political target defined as a ceiling on the future stock of 
pollution.  
    In Section 3, we analyse optimal environmental and innovation policies in a 
first-best setting as in Hartman and Kwon (2005) and Bramoullé and Olson (2005, cf 
Proposition 8).
7 The analysis of first-best policies carries an important result: the 
independence of environmental policy from innovation policy. In first best, the 
emission tax can be set equal to the Pigouvian level, and through complete markets 
                                                 
7 The model we use is rather differently. Both Hartman and Kwon (2005) and Bramoullé and Olson 
(2005) do not study separate incentive structures for knowledge development. 
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for innovations or through the appropriate innovation policy, technology will follow 
its optimal path without interfering with environmental policy. This result depends on 
complete instruments that enable the policy maker to implement the first-best 
technology path. On the other hand, we do find dependence of innovation policy from 
the stage of the environmental problem. If the patent lifetime is finite and constant, 
the R&D subsidy should be highest at the early stage when pollution stocks are small. 
The intuition is that innovations will be biased towards technologies that pay back 
within the patent’s lifetime, while there is less of an incentive to develop and improve 
technologies whose value lies in the farther future. The bias will be larger at the initial 
stage of an environmental problem. Alternatively, if the R&D subsidy is constant, the 
first-best can be implemented by having a longer initial lifetime of patents. 
Subsequently in Section 4 we consider a second-best setting, where we assume 
that subsidies on abatement equipment cannot be differentiated between those with 
running patents and those with expired patents.
8 This restriction on instruments 
follows the optimal patent literature discussed above. Now, optimal environmental 
policy becomes dependent on the innovation dynamics. We analyse the development 
over time of efficient environmental taxes relative to Pigouvian taxes and find that the 
efficient environmental tax exceeds the Pigouvian tax during the early stage of the 
environmental problem when there is a relatively rapid expansion of knowledge.  
    Finally, in Section 5 we summarise the results and conclude. 
 
2. OPTIMAL ABATEMENT AND RESEARCH 
We consider an economy with a stock pollutant. This could for instance be 
greenhouse gases. Further, we assume a benchmark emission path and a demand for 
abatement of emissions because of environmental considerations. For climate change, 
use of damage estimates for efficient policy is hugely debated, and instead, a ceiling 
on atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations seems the most widely accepted 
objective of policy. Thus, we follow the same approach and include in our model a 
ceiling on the pollution stock levels. 
  The abatement production model has a similar structure as the model in 
Iwaisako and Futagami (2003). It is based on Romer’s endogenous growth model 
(Romer, 1987, 1990; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995). Differently from Futagami and 
Iwaisako (2007), it has an infinite horizon with continuous time t. There is one 
representative abatement sector, which could either be interpreted as abatement of 
emissions (e.g., carbon capture and storage), or as an alternative, emission-free, 
resource sector (e.g. renewables). There are Ht producers of abatement equipment at 
each point of time t, and an R&D sector producing new ideas or innovations. 
Technological progress takes the form of expansion in the number of abatement 
equipment varieties. The producers of the abatement equipment own patents and, 
therefore, receive monopoly profits. However, they have to buy the innovations from 
the R&D sector, where innovators are competitive and use research effort as an input. 
We assume that patents have a certain lifetime T, and that the equipment using the 
innovations can be produced free of charge by anyone after expiration of the patent. 
Furthermore, we assume negative externalities from aggregate current research 
through crowding out of research effort. Thus, in this model there are three 
                                                 
8 A subsidy on abatement equipment is not the only policy instrument available to correct for market 
power due to the patent system. Licensing and contracts could also be used, see, e.g., Maurer and 
Scotchmer (2006). 
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imperfections related to innovations: too little production of abatement equipment due 
to monopolistic competition, positive spillovers of innovation after the expiration of 
the patent that are not taken into account by innovators as these maximise profits over 
the patent lifetime only, and negative spillovers of total research effort on new 
innovations. Thus, the level of innovations supported by the market may exceed or 
fall short of the social optimal level. 






t = –εSt + Et.  (1) 
 
The overall economy grows exogenously, and benchmark emissions Yt increase at a 
fixed rate gY,
10 while emissions can be reduced by abatement effort At:
11 
 
 E t = Yt – A t ≥ 0.  (2) 
 
Production of abatement requires the input xi of abatement equipment, where 
subscript i∈[0,Ht] refers to the variety, and Ht is the number of equipment varieties. 
Ht can also be interpreted as the state of knowledge. Abatement is produced according 
to: 
 
 A t = ∫0
H txt
β
,idi,  (3) 
 
where 0<β<1. The different varieties of abatement equipment are neither direct 
substitutes nor direct complements to other specific equipment. That is, the marginal 
product of each abatement equipment is independent of the quantity of any particular 
equipment, but depends on the total input of all other equipment varieties together.  
  We distinguish two different types of equipment: those with patents expired, 
of which we use yi, and those with running patents, of which we use zi. The number of 
varieties with expired patents is denoted Mt, and the number of varieties with running 
patents is denoted Nt. Adding up both gives the total knowledge stock 
 
 H t =Nt+Mt.   (4)  
 
All varieties have the same unit production costs. The varieties with expired patents 
are produced competitively, and sold at unit price. Because of symmetry between the 
varieties, in equilibrium the same quantity will be employed of each equipment with 
expired patent, i.e., yi=y. The varieties with running patents are produced by the 
patent holder, and sold at a mark up price pi. Again, because of symmetry, we have 
pi=p and zi=z for equipment with running patents. The production identity then 
becomes: 
                                                 
9 The stock dynamics of e.g. greenhouse gases are much more complex, but constant depreciation rates 
are commonly used in economic analysis (e.g., Goulder and Mathai, 2000). A more realistic modelling 
of the stock dynamics would not alter our qualitative conclusions. 
10  Y can be interpreted as energy demand, which is then treated as price-inelastic throughout the 
analysis. 
11 The relation between emissions and benchmark emissions is specified as a linear function for 
convenience of notation (a common assumption, cf Goulder and Mathai, 2000). A more general 
function would give the same qualitative results. 
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 A t = Mtyt
β + N
tzt
β.  (5) 
 
It is clear that the abatement sector has decreasing returns to scale when knowledge 
(Ht) is considered a fixed factor (since β<1), and increasing returns to scale when 
knowledge is considered an input at constant costs (since 1+β>1). Note that we 
assume that the productivity of abatement equipment does not diminish over time. 
  The producers of abatement equipment buy patents from innovators that 
operate in a competitive market.
12 Individual innovator j develops an amount ht,j of 
new varieties proportional to his individual effort rt,j; Rt=∫rt,jdj denotes aggregated 
research efforts by all innovators at time t. We assume that research crowds out the 
amount of new varieties found by other researchers, or alternatively that research 
resources are scarce, so that the following production function for new knowledge 
applies: 
 
 h t,j = rt,j Rt
ψ–1,  (6) 
 
where 0<ψ<1. Thus, equation (6) implies a negative externality from Rt through 
crowding out of current research. The externality is more severe the lower is the value 
of ψ.
13 Aggregation of (6) gives Rt
ψ for the aggregate number of new innovations. 
There is a positive spillover of research with a finite lifetime of patents as the private 
value of patents is less than the social value.
14 
  The flow of new varieties Rt
ψ adds to the pool of patented knowledge, Nt, but 
after a period T, which is the lifetime of a patent,
15 these varieties leave the pool of 
patented knowledge and enter the pool of patent-free knowledge Mt: 
 










–T  (8) 
 
Social Optimum 
The social planner aims at minimising the present value of social abatement costs, 
discounted at rate ρ, subject to the condition that the stock pollutant may not exceed a 
safe threshold S –. This could for instance be derived from the ultimate goal of the UN 
                                                 
12 Alternatively we could assume that the innovators are producing the abatement equipment, such that 
they own the patents and receive the monopoly rent. This would not change the arguments or 
conclusions of the analysis. 
13 The crowding out assumption basically means that there are decreasing returns to scale for a constant 
price of research effort. This may be a reasonable assumption as it will smooth the research path over 
time. Assume the contrary, i.e., that ψ=1. Then the conclusion from the optimisation problem below 
would be that we should delay all abatement until the pollution problem is so severe that the safe 
pollution threshold is reached. At this point of time, research spikes so that abatement becomes cheap 
and pollution becomes close to zero. 
14 Note that this model does not specify a dynamic spillover effect based on earlier research. This could 
have been introduced for instance by letting h increase in H, see, e.g., Goulder and Mathai (2000) and 
Gerlagh et al. (2006). The reason we do not introduce this spillover effect is to avoid too many 
imperfections in the model. 
15 Note that in Sections 3 and 4, we allow the lifetime to vary over time. 
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Framework Convention on Climate Change, which is “stabilisation of greenhouse-gas 
concentrations… at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference 
with the climate system” (United Nations, 1992).
16 
  The social abatement costs are the sum of the costs of abatement equipment 
Mtyt, Ntzt, and research Rt, where all unit costs are equal to one. The social planner 
minimizes the net present value of all future costs 
 
 Min    ∫0
∞
 e
–ρt[Mtyt + Ntzt + Rt]dt,   (9) 
 
subject to the stock restriction St≤S –, stock accumulation dynamics (1), and production 
equations (2), (5), (7) and (8), with yt, zt, Rt, the control variables. Because of the 
lagged structure in the building of the knowledge stocks in (7) and (8), the use of 
Hamiltonians is not straightforward. But if we can show that equipment based on 
running and expired patents are used at the same intensity, yt=zt, we can discard the 
distinction between the two stocks Mt and Nt and just consider the overall stock of 
knowledge Ht. 
 Let  θt be the shadow price of the stock externality, that is, the present value 
costs associated with a one-unit increase in pollution St. Obviously, as abatement 
reduces emissions one-to-one, see (2), θt is also the marginal social value (benefit) of 
abatement At. Further, as we consider an efficient allocation where costs and benefits 
of abatement are equal, θt also measures the production costs of abatement and is thus 
the dual variable for equation (5). Thus, marginal social costs at time t with respect to 
abatement equipment yt and zt are Mt and Nt for expired and running patents, 
respectively, while marginal social benefits of abatement with respect to the same 
equipment are equal to βθtMtyt
β–1 and  βθtNtzt
β–1, respectively (cf., eq. (5)). 
Equalizing marginal costs and benefits results in: 
 
 y t = zt = (βθt)
1/1–β  
                                                
(10) 
 
Thus, in social optimum (first-best), the use of abatement equipment should be the 
same for patented and patent-free knowledge, the value of new patented knowledge 
and expired patents are the same. The reason is that the social value is equal for both 
types of equipment, and so we only need to consider Ht=Mt+Nt. Thus, when 
studying the social optimal path, patent policies can be analyzed ex post. Aggregate 
production (5) and knowledge dynamics (7) and (8) then become: 
 
 A t = Htxt
β




ψ .  (12) 
 
 
16 One of the first papers to study stabilisation targets was Wigley et al. (1996). Stabilisation scenarios 
have also received special attention by the IPCC, see, e.g., IPCC (2000). A stabilisation target can be 
used by policy makers as a rule of thumb, based on a cost-effectiveness analysis. Alternatively, we 
could have used a damage function instead of a stabilisation target. A stabilisation target typically 
results in an optimal carbon tax that is increasing at least up to the time when the ceiling is hit (t
*), see 
below. If a convex damage function is used, a sufficient condition for the tax path to slope upwards is 
that the optimal emission path also slopes upward, see Hoel and Kverndokk (1996) and Goulder and 
Mathai (2000).  
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For this system, i.e., minimising the present value of social costs subject to the stock 
accumulation dynamics (1), the restriction on the stock St≤S –, and production 
equations (2), (11) and (12), we can write down the current value Hamiltonian, Ht: 
 
  Ht = Htxt + Rt + θt(–εSt + Yt – Htxt
β) – ηtRt
ψ  + λt(St–S –).  (13) 
 
Notice that we have changed the sign of θt (as compared to a dual variable in a 
standard Hamiltonian) as the resource stock has a negative value. This change in sign 
also comes back in the first order conditions for St, Ht, xt and Rt: 
 
  θ ·
t = ρθt – Ht,S = (ρ+ε)θt – λt.  (14) 
  η ·
t = ρηt + Ht,H = ρηt + xt –  θtxt
β
  (15) 
  0 = Ht,x = Ht – βθtHtxt
β–1   (16) 
  0 = Ht,R = 1 – ψηtRt
 ψ–1
  (17) 
 
For future reference, it is useful to write the primitives of the first-order condition for 
St  (14) and for Ht (15). The price of pollution, θt, is equal to the net present value of 
the future shadow price λt for the stock ceiling St≤S –. For discounting, we use the real 
interest rate ρ plus the depreciation rate for the stock ε. This gives the standard 
expression for the shadow price of the stock externality (see, e.g., Goulder and 
Mathai, 2000):  
 
  θt =  ∫0
∞
 e
–(ρ+ε)s λt+s ds  (18) 
 
We see that (14) is identical to the time derivative of (18). Before the ceiling is hit, 
that is for t<t
*, λt=0 and the shadow price for the stock increases at rate ρ+ε, see (14). 
Thus, the change in this shadow price is independent of innovation. 
  Similarly, we can calculate the price of knowledge, ηt, see
 (19) below. As 
marginal knowledge is defined as a new variety, this price measures the net present 
social value of this variety. From equation (5), we see that the immediate social 
benefit of a new variety is equal to θtz
β
t, whereas social costs are equal to unit 
production costs, zt. The aggregated value of a variety is thus equal to θtz
β
t,–zt during 
the patent period, plus the value after the patent has expired, ζt. In turn, the value of an 
expired patent is the net present value of its future use (20). 
 





t+s – zt+s)ds + e
–ρTζt+T  (19) 





t+s  – yt+s)ds  (20) 
 
The first-order condition for Ht, (15), is identical to the time derivative of (19) and 
(20) (where we use xt=yt=zt; ηt=ζt). 
  The first-order condition for xt, (16), gives us (10), with yt=zt. If we substitute 
this equation in the value of a variety, θtz
β
t–zt, we find that the variety value is equal 
to (β
–1–1)zt, where β
–1zt is the value in production, and zt are the production costs. 
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  The immediate value of knowledge is thus equal to the net present value of the 
use of abatement equipment, multiplied by a factor (β
–1–1).  
 




–ρs zt+sds + e
–ρTζt+T  (21) 




–ρsyt+s ds  (22) 
 
Calculating the value of knowledge in first best, as in (21) and (22) gives: 
 




–ρsxt+s ds,  (23) 
 








 ds.  (24) 
 
As seen, this equation links the research effort to the future stream of abatement 
expenditures. It gives us a first insight into a distinctive property of the optimum that 
we will frequently return to later. At the left-hand side, we have a measure that is 
increasing with the current research expenditures. At the right-hand side, we have a 
measure of the net present value of a future stream of abatement expenditures. If 
abatement expenditures are rapidly growing, then the right-hand side may have a very 
large value, compared to the current expenditures on abatement equipment, xt. Thus, 
when abatement levels are rapidly increasing, the ratio of research relative to 
abatement is large compared to a situation where abatement grows only slowly. In the 
following sections we will show that this has important implications for the levels of 
first- and second-best policy instruments. 
  To allow us a formal treatment of the different stages of an environmental 
problem, we describe in a lemma how the time that the ceiling is reached depends on 
the initial emission level. This lemma will then be used later to show that the value of 
knowledge relative to the value of abatement is without bound at the initial stage of an 
environmental problem. Let us denote the time that the ceiling is hit by t
*, and the 
initial benchmark emissions Y0. If we assume that initial benchmark emissions 
become arbitrarily small relative to the difference between the cap and current stock 
of pollution, then it will take an arbitrarily long time until period t
* when the pollution 
stock will hit the ceiling, St*=S –.
17,18 
 
                                                 
17 Notice that for large (gy+ε)(S
–
 – S0)/Y
0, another inequality can be used that sometimes provides a 





18 Notice that for small values of (gy+ε)(S
–
 – S0)/Y
0, we get t* ≈ (S
–
 – S0)/Y
0. Considering the climate 
change problem, St  can be seen as the stock or atmospheric concentration of CO2 above the 
preindustrial level (i.e., above 280 ppmv). If we consider a ceiling of 550 ppmv CO2eq, and a current 
concentration of 430 ppmv CO2eq, while the annual concentrations increase at about 2.5 ppmv/yr, then 
at current pace it will take about 50 years to hit the ceiling. 
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LEMMA 1. The time it takes to reach the cap satisfies t
*>ln[1+(gy+ε)(S – – S0)/Y0]/ 




We provide the proof of all lemmas in the appendix. The lemma is not surprising: it 
clearly holds even when emissions follow the benchmark path. The precise value of 
the time t* is not the most important. We think of t* as large as ‘when the time that 
we will hit the ceiling is still far away’ in economic terms. Considering global 
warming, time t* refers to the time that the atmospheric greenhouse gas concentration 
will reach its peak (that is when the ceiling is hit). The atmospheric CO2 concentration 
will probably not peak before 2050, and in economic terms, this is far away in the 
sense that the abatement expenditures after 2050 probably do not play a major role in 
current private decision making for innovations.  
  In some cases, we don’t need the ‘far away’ assumption. In Proposition 1, we 
describe a property of the optimum that holds at all time before t*. In Proposition 5 
we find another property that holds as long as the peak is sufficiently far away so that 
current patents have expired. If patents run for 20 years, than we can interpret this 
condition as ‘if atmospheric CO2 concentrations will continue to rise for the coming 
20 years’, a most probable assumption. In other cases, though, we cannot know for 
sure that the variables rise or fall monotonically, but we can show that they start at 
very high or low level, and must fall or rise, respectively, broadly speaking before the 
pollution levels peak, or before the ceiling is hit.   
  The lemma below shows that when the ceiling is still far away, the value of 
knowledge is very high compared to the expenditures on abatement equipment. This 
result is central to the policy analysis in later sections. Notice that though the ratio 
ηt/xt in the proposition seems technical, it has a clear interpretation as knowledge 
stock value ηtHt over knowledge flow value Htxt. 
 
LEMMA 2. For Y0/(S – – S0) → 0, the initial social value of knowledge relative to 
expenditures on abatement equipment increases without bound: η0/x0 → ∞. 
 
Again, we defer the proof to the appendix, and immediately present the more 
interesting proposition, which tells us that, not only is the knowledge stock value 
infinitely higher than the flow value initially, their ratio also decreases monotonically 
over time until the pollution ceiling is hit. That is, at the emerging phase of an 
environmental problem, development of the stock of knowledge is much more 
important relative to the use of knowledge for actual abatement, compared to later 
stages of the environmental problem. This result resembles the finding by Goulder 
and Mathai (2000) that with R&D, we should first focus on knowledge building and 
only at a later stage should we deploy the knowledge for actual abatement efforts. 
 
PROPOSITION 1. The social value of knowledge relative to expenditures on abatement 
equipment, ηt/xt, monotonically falls for 0<t< t* 
 
Proof. The proposition follows from the observation that the stock value of 
knowledge, ηt, increases at a strictly lower rate as the flow value xt, as long as t<t*, so 
that the ratio must decrease. To compare the growth rates, notice that (23) gives for 
the rate of increase of ηt 
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  η ·
t/ηt = ρ – (β
–1–1)xt t/ηt < ρ  (25) 
 
At the same time, we have from (14) that for t<t*, θ increases at rate ρ+ε, so that xt 
must increase at rate (ρ+ε)/(1–β)>ρ (10). Thus, the ratio ηt/xt must fall. ■ 
 
We can also establish the long-term balanced growth path to which the optimum 
converges. This will be useful in the analysis of first-best policy instruments in the 
next section. 
 





For costs (9) and the value of knowledge (23) to be bounded, we assume gY<ρ, and 
gx<ρ which means that ψ/(1–ψ)+β≥1. 
 
3. MARKET EQUILIBRIUM AND FIRST-BEST POLICY 
We now describe the market equilibrium, given a set of policy instruments, and 
search for the first-best policy. In Section 4 we turn to second-best policies. 
Abatement goods 
The public agent implements an emission tax τt, or more generally an environmental 
policy that induces a cost of emission in the market. From (2) we see that this 
translates into a market price for abatement At, as Et and At are perfect substitutes. 
Abatement equipment without running patents is supplied at unit production costs. 
Equipment with running patents is supplied at a mark-up price pt>1 (see below), but 
is also subsidized at rate st to correct for market power.
19 The abatement producer 
maximises the value of production minus the input costs: 
 
 Max τtAt –∫0
M txt,idi – ∫M
H
t
t(1–st,i) pt,ixt,idi,  (26) 
 
subject to (5) , where xt,i is the control variable vector. 
The first order conditions of this maximisation problem determine the 
abatement producer’s demand for patent-free and patented varieties, respectively: 
 
 y t,i = (βτt)
1/(1–β), (27) 
 z t,i = (βτt/(1–st,i)pt,i)
1/(1–β) ,  (28) 
 
where we can drop the subscript i for varieties when convenient. The first order 
condition for patent-free varieties yt in (27) is similar to the corresponding condition 
under the social optimum given by (10), with the exception that the social price, θt, is 
replaced by the market price of abatement, τt, (i.e., the Pigouvian tax is replaced by 
the emission tax). This is not the case for patent-holding varieties, zt, however. 
Comparing the first-order condition (10) with the market equilibrium (28) for patent-
                                                 
19 Other policy instruments could also have been considered, see, e.g., Scotchmer (1991), but to keep 
the analysis simple, we choose a deployment subsidy.  
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holding varieties, we see that the market is undersupplied due to monopolistic 
behaviour if the emission tax is set equal to the Pigouvian tax and there is no 
deployment subsidy (st=0). Setting a constant subsidy st=1–1/pt for the supply of 
patent-holding varieties, jointly with implementing the Pigouvian tax, τt=θt, will 
implement the first-best flows of varieties.  
Monopolistic supply of abatement equipment  
The producers of patented abatement equipment act as monopolists. Their costs of 
producing equipment zt,i are set to unity, and at each point in time they maximise 
profits (or the rent value of the patent), πt,i, taking into account the falling demand 
curves for abatement equipment.: 
 
 Max πt,i = zt,i(pt,i–1),   (29) 
 
subject to (28). 
The first order condition from maximising (29) with respect to pt,i determines 
the price of the abatement equipment: 
 
 p t,i = p = 1/β.   (30) 
 
From (28) and (30) we find the market equilibrium level of zt,i: 
 
 z t,i = (β
2τt/(1–st))
1/(1–β).  (31) 
 
As all varieties are identical (zt,i=zt), and prices are equal across varieties, the rent 
value of a patent is also equal for all innovations, i.e., πt,i=πt. Using this in addition to 
(29), we find the rent value of a patent: 
 
  πt = (β
–1–1)zt.  (32) 
 
The value of a patent can now easily be calculated as the net present value of the 
future patent rents, over the patent lifetime Tt: 
 
 V t =  ∫0
Tt e
–ρt πt+s ds = (β
–1–1) ∫0
T t e
–ρt zt+s ds.  (33) 
 
Notice that we now allow for the patent lifetime to change over time, and to be used 
by the public agent as a policy instrument. Also note that the value of a patent 
increases with the deployment subsidy because the demand for equipment increases 
(cf. (31)). Thus, both patent lifetime and deployment subsidies affect the incentives 
for research. 
Markets for innovation 
The innovators maximise profit with respect to research effort, where the price of the 
innovation equals Vt, i.e., the net present value of the patent over its lifetime. The 
government subsidizes research expenditures at rate σt:  
 
 Max Vtht,j – (1–σt)rt,j,  (34) 
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subject to (6) . 
First order conditions give that the unit cost of research, which is set equal to 
one, is equal to the value of the patent, Vt, multiplied by the productivity of rt,j, Rt
ψ–1. 
Due to the zero-profit condition, in equilibrium the value of all patents is equal to the 
value of all research effort: 
 
 V t Rt
ψ = (1–σt)Rt.  (35) 
Market equilibrium 
The eight equations (5), (7), (8), (27), (31), (32), (33) and (35) define a market 
equilibrium through the variables At, Mt, Nt, yt, zt, πt, Vt, Rt, for a given environmental 
tax policy τt, subsidies st and σt, and patent lifetime Tt. The next proposition states that 
for given policy instruments, the equilibrium exists and is unique; this is a prerequisite 
for the public agent to steer the economy towards the efficient allocation. 
 
PROPOSITION 2. For given initial state of knowledge, M0 and N0, a tax policy defined 
by τt>0, subsidies defined by st<1 and σt<1, and patent lifetime Tt, a unique 
equilibrium path exists. 
 
Proof. Equations (27) and (31) determine the equipment inputs yt and zt, respectively. 
Substitution of (31) in (32) provides πt, and subsequent substitution in (33) gives an 
unambiguous value for a new patent at time t, Vt, as dependent on future taxes and 
deployment subsidies. Subsequently, (35) determines the research effort dependent on 
the current research subsidy, and (7) and (8) determine the state of knowledge for all 
t. In the end, (5) determines the abatement level. ■ 
First-best policy 
Note that innovations depend on the tax and subsidy policies for the coming Tt 
periods. When patent lifetime Tt goes to infinity, innovators take into account benefits 
over the full future horizon. On the other hand, when patent lifetime is finite, then 
innovators are short or medium-sighted, and thus there is a positive externality from 
innovations. This feature is the core distinction between our R&D model and earlier 
R&D models in the environmental economics literature. 
  We now compare the social optimal research effort (24) with the market 







–ρs zt+s ds  (36) 
 
A comparison quickly reveals the optimal research subsidy level (remember that 









 ds.  (37) 
 
Note that the subsidy rate may be negative if the negative externalities from research 
(i.e., crowding out) dominate the positive externalities that appear after the patent has 
expired. 
  We are now able to define the first best policy to obtain the social optimum: 
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PROPOSITION  3.  Through a tax on emissions equal to the Pigouvian tax, τt=θt, a 
subsidy on patented abatement equipment equal to st = 1–β, and either a finite 
patent lifetime Tt or an R&D subsidy σt, or a combination of these, as defined 
by (37), the first-best outcome can be implemented. 
 
Proof: There are three types of imperfections in the model; pollution, imperfect 
competition in the market for patented abatement equipment, and positive and 
negative externalities of research effort. Therefore, we would need three policy 
instruments to implement the social optimum: a tax on emissions, a subsidy to 
producers of patented abatement equipment, and either a subsidy on research effort or 
a patent lifetime that can be adjusted over time (or a combination of these). 
  The optimal combination of the patent lifetime and the research subsidy 
follows from (37). 
  Comparing the social optimum in equation (10) with the market equilibrium in 
(27) and (28), and using the market price defined by (30), we find the optimal policy 
instruments to be τt=θt and st = 1–β. ■ 
 
Whether the optimal level of σt is positive or negative is of course important, but here 
we are more interested in its dynamics. The next Proposition states that when patents 
remain valid infinitely, then the innovation market is complete except for the 
crowding out effect, and innovation policy is independent from environmental policy. 
 
PROPOSITION 4. For patents with infinite lifetime, Tt→∞, the efficient R&D subsidy 
that implements the first-best outcome is negative and constant, σt=1–1/ψ. 
 
The proof follows straightforwardly from (37). It’s meaning is far-reaching. If 
innovation markets are complete, innovation policy can be separated from 
environmental policy. That is, the stage of the environmental problem has no effect on 
the R&D subsidy. The natural extension of this specific case is to consider the case 
with incomplete innovation markets, for example when patents have finite lifetime. 
We want to consider two specific cases. First, when patents have constant finite 
lifetime and we must dynamically adjust the research subsidy to implement the first 
best, and second, when research subsidy is constant and the patent lifetime must be 
adjusted dynamically.  
 
PROPOSITION 5. Consider the case that patents have constant finite lifetime, Tt=T<∞. 
For Y0/(S – – S0) → 0, the first-best research subsidy at t=0 converges to 
100%: σ0 → 1, and decreases monotonically for t ≤ t
*–T. The long-term first-
best research subsidy converges to a constant number below unity: σt → σ∞ 
with –1<σ∞<1. 
 
Proof: The first part of the proof follows straightforwardly from (37) and the 
observations made for the proof of Lemma 2, i.e., that xt (or zt) increases by a constant 
rate strictly higher than the real interest rate for t < t
* (and t
* →  ∞). This latter 
observation, together with the fact that the Pigouvian tax (and thus zt) increases by a 
lower rate after t = t
*, imply that the numerator in (37) must grow faster than the 
denominator as long as t ≤ t
*–T. Thus, the optimal subsidy must decline, which proves 
the second part. The last part follows from (37) and Lemma 3, which gives the 
following expression for σt when t→∞: σ∞=1–ψ
–1(1–e
–(ρ–g x)T). ■ 
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According to Proposition 5, when patents have constant and finite life time, the 
optimal subsidy starts at its highest possible value, i.e., 100 per cent, and then 
monotonically declines during the first phase of a new environmental problem. The 
subsidy declines until the ceiling is T years ahead (and possibly longer). An 
interpretation is that initially environmental policy should focus on knowledge 
development, while employment of abatement technology becomes relatively more 
important at a later stage. 
 
PROPOSITION 6. Consider the case with zero research subsidies: σt=0. For Y0/(S – –
 S0) → 0, to support the first-best, the initial patent lifetime increases without 
bound: T0 → ∞. The long-term first-best patent lifetime is finite: Tt → T∞ 
with T∞<∞. If research subsidies are constant (not necessarily zero), then the 




Proof: The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 5. The first part follows 
straightforwardly from the observation that for any finite T0, and σ0=0, (37) cannot 
hold (see proof of Lemma 2). The second part follows from Lemma 3. 
    The last part follows from the observation that the Pigouvian tax (and thus zt) 
increases by a lower rate after t = t
*, and this implies that the numerator in (37) must 
grow faster than the denominator as long as t ≤ t
*–T, unless the patent time decreases 
to correct for this. ■ 
 
Thus, according to Proposition 5 and Proposition 6, with incomplete innovation 
markets, there is a clear link between the first-best innovation policy and the stage of 
an environmental problem. In the early stages, when the environmental stock is far 
from its ceiling, research should be stimulated maximally, either through high subsidy 
rates or through very long patent lifetime.  
The intuition is that in the early stages, the price of emissions and thus the 
value of abatement is low. The main benefits of the technology come at later stages, 
when the price of emissions has risen. With finite patent lifetime, the private benefits 
of innovation will typically be low compared to the social benefits. Consequently, the 
optimal subsidy should be relatively high, or alternatively the patent lifetime should 
be long. At later stages, when the emission price is high, more benefits are reaped 
during the lifetime of the patent, and thus the need for research subsidies diminishes. 
Obviously, in reality the public agent cannot provide a 100 per cent subsidy to 
research firms, without strict control of the research effort carried out.
20 Infinite 
patents are also difficult to enforce. Thus, a more realistic alternative may be public 
R&D in the early stages of development, and a larger role for private R&D when the 
environmental problem develops.  
With respect to global warming, it may be argued that we have passed the very 
early stage as we are in a situation with relatively high greenhouse gas emissions. Yet, 
it seems unlikely that we will succeed to stop the increase in atmospheric GHG 
concentrations before 2050. By that time, current patents will have run out, and in that 
sense, we are still on the transition path with falling optimal subsidies (Proposition 5). 
That is, abatement R&D subsidies should be higher now compared to their levels in, 
say, 10 years. 
                                                 
20 In the EU there is an upper limit to the legitimate rate of R&D subsidy. 
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4. OPTIMAL POLICY IN SECOND-BEST 
The literature has paid extensive attention to the analysis of optimal patent lifetime, 
based on the assumption that policies to correct for market power such as deployment 
subsidies, cannot be differentiated between those with running patents and those with 
expired patents (see, e.g., Judd, 1985; Chou and Shy, 1993; Iwaisako and Futagami, 
2003). In this second-best world, the public agent has only two instruments available: 
the environmental tax and the research subsidy, or alternatively patent lifetime. Now 
we are interested in how these two instruments should be designed in the second-best 
world where the deployment subsidy is set to zero: st=0.  
From (27) and (31) we find that zt = β
1/(1–β)yt. The resulting welfare program 
is then: 
 








t = –εSt + Yt – (Mt + β
β/(1–β)Nt)yt
β











–T ,  (41) 
 
and St≤S –, where yt and Rt are the control variables. The first order condition for yt is 
now: 
 
 M t + β




where θt is defined by (18). If we compare this condition with the market equilibrium 
(27), we find: 
 
  τt/θt = (Mt + β
β/(1–β)Nt) / (Mt + β
1/(1–β)Nt). (43) 
 
We immediately see that when all patents are expired, Nt=0, the environmental tax 
should equal the Pigouvian tax. This is not surprising as the deployment subsidy in 
the first-best world only applies to patented technologies, and thus the restriction on 
this subsidy no longer bites.  
On the other hand, when a new technology is developed and all patents are 
still running, Mt=0, then the environmental tax should exceed the Pigouvian tax by a 
factor 1/β, which is exactly the market price of patented equipment. The explanation 
for this is that emission and abatement are perfect substitutes, so that a tax on 
emissions translates into a corresponding value of abatement.  
With both running and expired patents in the market, the second-best ratio 
between the environmental tax and the Pigouvian tax is strictly bounded from above 
by 1/β and from below by unity. We also note that the ratio increases with the ratio 
between running and expired patents. 
  The first order condition for Rt is still (17), where ηt and ζt are given by (19) 
and (20). The problem is that the integrals that define the value of knowledge both 
contain the shadow price θt, and the use of equipment yt and zt, which depend on the 
  16VERSION OF 18 MAY 2008 
environmental tax level τt. However, the important point to recognize is that the social 
value of knowledge ηt is still linked to the integral of equipment use over the infinite 
horizon. We state this as a lemma, which we prove in the appendix. 
 
LEMMA 4. The marginal social value of knowledge is linked to the net present value of 
all future equipment use in the following way: 
 
  ηt =  αt ∫0
∞
 e
–ρsyt+s ds,  (44) 
 
where αt is a variable uniformly bounded from below and above: 0<α
LB<αt<α
UB. 
Similarly, the private value of a patent is linked to the same integral, but over a finite 
horizon: 
 
 V t =  γt ∫0
Tt
 e






Taking these two ’approximations’, together with the definition of the optimal 
research subsidy (cf. (17) and (35), which still hold): 
 
σt = 1–Vt/ψηt
 ,  (46) 
 
we can now easily prove: 
 
PROPOSITION  7.  Consider the second-best optimum with no deployment subsidies, 
st=0, no expired patents initially, M0= 0, and where patents have constant 
finite lifetime, T<∞.  
    The initial ratio between the second-best environmental tax and the Pigouvian 
tax τ0/θ0 is 1/β, and it decreases with the ratio between expired and running 
patents, Mt/Nt.  
   For  Y0/(S – – S0) → 0, the initial second-best research subsidy converges to 
100%: σ0 → 1. Alternatively, when there is no research subsidy, the initial 
patent lifetime must increase without bound.  
 
Proof: The first part follows directly from the discussion in the text above. The 
second part follows from Lemma 3, using the same argument as used in the proof of 
Lemma 2. ■ 
 
When subsidies to abatement equipment are infeasible, Proposition 7 tells us 
that the environmental tax should be lifted from the Pigouvian level as long as there 
are running patents in the market. The intuition is that too few patented abatement 
equipment is sold due to mark-up pricing. By raising the environmental tax, demand 
for the equipment increases. The larger the share of technologies with running patents, 
the more important it is to adjust the tax upwards. The proposition also informs us that 
Proposition 5 and Proposition 6 in the first-best world carry over qualitatively to this 
second-best world. That is, research should be stimulated maximally when the 
environmental problem is in its early stages. The reason is as follows. At the early 
stages of an environmental problem, the value of knowledge as a stock for future use 
is much larger than its value in current use to build abatement equipment. Patents do 
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not fully capture this future use of knowledge, and therefore, high subsidies are 
required to develop knowledge. 
 
5. CONCLUSION  
In the climate change literature a pressing question is whether the prospect of future 
stringent policies are sufficient to pull technological innovation, or whether we should 
stimulate extra the development of clean technologies for future use, either through 
direct support (technology push) or through upfront enforced higher abatement levels 
(technology pull). In the current paper we have studied this question by investigating 
the links between (the timing of) innovation policies and abatement policies under 
different assumptions regarding access to policy instruments. The analysis is based on 
an R&D model supplemented with emission-abatement-pollution dynamics, and three 
imperfections related to innovations; too little production of patented abatement 
equipment due to monopolistic competition, positive spillovers of innovations due to 
finite patent lifetime, and negative spillovers of total research effort on new 
innovations. Innovation policy instruments may include deployment subsidies to 
patented equipment, research subsidies, and the lifetime of patents. 
In a first-best situation where the public authority is able to correct for all 
imperfections, it is optimal to spend much of the initial effort on technological 
development. Furthermore, the efficient environmental tax should equal the Pigouvian 
tax. In this sense, environmental policy is independent of innovation dynamics. 
However, the other way around, innovation policy may depend on the environmental 
dynamics. If the patent lifetime is infinite, which is often assumed implicitly in 
energy-emissions-environment models with innovation, the R&D subsidy should be 
constant. On the other hand, if patents have a finite lifetime, the optimal subsidy is not 
constant. It should start at a high level, giving an incentive to accelerate R&D 
investments, and then fall over time as the environmental problem becomes more 
mature. In a similar way, if the research subsidy is constant, the optimal lifetime of a 
patent should be very high initially and fall. 
The reason that optimal innovation policy depends on the dynamics of the 
environmental problem is that at the early stages, the price of emissions or the value 
of abatement is low as the environmental problem is minor. The main benefits of the 
technology come at later stages, when the price of emissions has risen. With finite 
patent lifetime, the private benefits of innovation will typically be low initially 
compared to the social benefits. To correct for this, the optimal subsidy should be 
high, or alternatively the patent lifetime should be long. At later stages, when the 
emission price is high, more benefits are reaped during the lifetime of the patent, and 
thus the need for research subsidies diminishes. Thus, in the phase of an emerging 
environmental problem, substantial public funds are to be directed to developing 
environmentally friendly technologies, either through public R&D or through high 
subsidies on private R&D. A long lifetime of patents would also require high public 
funds over a longer period of time to correct for market power. 
The arguments above are based on the assumptions that the public authority 
can correct for market power created by the patent system. However, most of the 
literature on endogenous growth and innovation policies does not assume such 
correction. If we follow this line, we find that the optimal environmental policy is no 
longer independent of innovation dynamics. The clean technology should now be 
extra stimulated through an increased demand for its produced goods. That is, the 
efficient environmental tax should exceed the Pigouvian tax. The technology pull 
  18VERSION OF 18 MAY 2008 
policy should be relatively strong during the emerging phase of the environmental 
problem, when abatement technologies still have to mature, so that the relative 
difference between the efficient environmental tax and the Pigouvian tax should fall 
over time. This gives an argument for a more aggressive abatement policy in the early 
phase compared to the first best solution.  
  As a final comment, we notice that the theoretical analysis we carried out has 
been fairly general, so that our findings may imply more generally that infant 
industries should be stimulated to a larger degree than mature industries. This topic 
may be worked out in future research. 
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APPENDIX: PROOFS 
Proof of Lemma 1. We use the following inequality based on the depreciation of the 
pollutant: 
 
 S – = St* = e
–εt* S0 + ∫0
t*
 e
ε(s–t*) Es ds.  (47) 
 
where ε is the natural depreciation of emissions. As benchmark emissions follow an 
exponential growth path, and Et≤Yt, we can multiply the RHS by e
εt* to get 
 
 S – < S0 + Y0∫0
t*
e
(gy+ε)sds = S0+ Y0 [e
(gy+ε)t*–1]/(gy+ε),  (48) 
 




* > ln[1+(gy+ε)(S – – S0)/Y0]/(gy+ε),  (49) 
 
which increases without bound as Y0/(S – – S0) → 0.  ■  
 
Proof of Lemma 2. The first part of the proposition is obvious when H0=0 as this 
means that x0=0, so we only need to consider the case with H0>0. Before the ceiling 
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is hit, that is for t<t
*, λt=0 and the shadow price for the stock increases at rate ρ+ε, 
see (14), and consequently, abatement equipment use xt increases at rate (ρ+ε)/(1–β), 
see (10), a strictly higher rate than the real interest rate ρ. The lemma now simply 
follows from (23) 
 





 ds,  (50) 
 
where the term in the integral is increasing exponentially so that for t
*→ ∞ (which we 
found in Lemma 1) we must have η0/x0 → ∞. ■ 
 
Proof of Lemma 3. Along the balanced growth to which the economy converges, we 
must have that emissions are bounded from above, thus abatement grows at the same 
rate as benchmark emissions, see (2): gA=gY. Furthermore, from the production 
equation (11) we have gA=gH+βgx. From (12) we derive gH=ψgR. From (24) we find 
(1–ψ)gR=gx. Bringing this together, we find gY=[ψ+β(1–ψ)]gR,  gY=[ψ/(1–
ψ)+β]gx. ■  
 





t+s – yt+s). The growth rate of knowledge cannot be infinite (apart 
from when Ht=0), so that there is an ε>0 with Nt/(Mt+Nt)<1–ε for all t>t
UB where t
UB is 




  (1+ε)βτt ≤ θt ≤ τt. (51) 
 
If we substitute equipment levels yt
(1–β) = βτt from (27) in this inequality, we get:  
 
  (1+ε)yt




Multiplying all sides by yt




  εyt ≤ θt yt
β – yt ≤ (β
–1–1)
 yt. (53) 
 
Similarly, from (31) we have zt = (β
2τt)
1/(1–β). Then by using zt = β
1/(1–β) yt, we get 




1/(1–β) yt ≤ θt zt
β – zt ≤ (β
–2–1)
 β
1/(1–β) yt. (54) 
 









1/(1–β)} for (44). For the patent value (45), we can use a 
similar procedure. ■ 
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